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This paper argues that economic competition and political contestability are two key 
determinants of the successful development of the Swiss economy in the nineteenth and 
twentieth century. We describe how Switzerland evolved from a relatively poor country 
with no natural resources and net emigration in 1800 to one of the richest countries of 
the world two hundred years later. Based on quantitative and qualitative evidence, we 
argue that early internationalization, open and flexible markets as well as a high degree 
of competition were crucial for the development of the Swiss economy. In addition, the 
Swiss political system with its direct democratic elements and the implemented 
principle of subsidiarity created political contestability that maintained government 
efficiency and led to political stability throughout history. The combination of these 
elements seems to explain the Swiss success, but also to make it difficult for other 
countries to adopt. 
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Today, Switzerland is mainly known for its mountains and lakes, well-functioning 
infrastructure and high-quality products and services. Some would associate 
Switzerland with chocolate, watches and cheese. Others might think of Swiss banks and 
multinational companies or of Geneva as the host to international organizations such as 
the World Trade Organization (WTO). But above all, everybody would think of 
Switzerland being a rich country. In fact, it has been among the richest nations of the 
world for many decades. 
Let us imagine for a moment how Switzerland and its perspectives would have looked 
like about 200 years ago. The mountains and lakes were there—but there was little else. 
Switzerland was a poor country. Exports included mercenaries that served in foreign 
armies. The country had no natural resources and was exposed to many different 
cultures and influences that generated tensions and conflicts throughout history. There 
was a net emigration of people. Even after the take-off of the industrialization in the 
second half of the nineteenth century, the standard of living in this country remained 
behind that of other European countries.  
What explains the rise of Switzerland? When did Switzerland stop being a laggard and 
become an economic success story? Are there any lessons that other countries could 
learn from the factors that combined to achieve rapid growth and development? We 
suggest that a high level of competition in goods and labour markets combined with a 
political system that ensured contestability provide the basis for stability and prosperity 
of Switzerland. We note that openness towards foreign markets and early 
internationalization of companies led to a high degree of competition with positive 
effects on innovation, productivity and flexibility. The characteristics of the Swiss 
political system, i.e., direct democracy combined with a high degree of federalism or 
subsidiarity, led to political contestability that maintained stability and decentralization. 
How does our line of argument distinguish itself from other hypotheses trying to explain 
the economic development of Switzerland? Whereas some have stressed characteristics 
of the Swiss people (e.g., working ethics and entrepreneurial spirit), others mentioned 
the importance of individual sectors (e.g., banks or trading companies) or individual 
policies (e.g., banking secrecy or neutrality) or they assign an important role to chance 
(e.g., central location in Europe or no involvement in the First or Second World Wars).1 
While we do not think that these aspects are irrelevant, they are not key in our analysis. 
Our explanation is more closely related to Danthine and Lambelet (1987) and David and 
Mach (2006). The former consider a combination of flexible labour markets which they 
describe as ‘cooperative labour relations’ (Danthine and Lambelet 1987: 168) and a 
highly diversified economy as a key for the success—particularly in mastering the 
period from 1965 to 1985 characterized by severe structural changes. The latter 
emphasize the importance of the Swiss political institutions and argue that the various 
‘institutions of conflict resolution’ and compensation (e.g., the allowance of cartels or 
the labour-peace agreement) as well as the many examples of ‘efficient public-private 
                                                 
1   For example, see Stucki (1981). Some of these arguments are closely related to Max Weber’s (1934) 
‘Protestant Ethic’ as a driving force for success.   
 
Table 1 
Switzerland: a success story? 
 
GDP pc PPP, 
avg. 1975-2005   











































































Column (1)     (2)   (3)   (4)    (5)   (6)   (7)    (8)   
Austria 18,984  5    39,590  10 18,751  6 3.56 4 3.94  3 0.8984  11 77.4  8 260  3  6 
Belgium 18,297  7    38,600  11 18,464  7 4.07  6 7.99  10 0.9039 9 76.3 14 243 10  9 
Denmark  19,358 4    51,700 3 19,109 4 5.44  9 6.41 7 0.9066 7 76.2 15 273  1  6 
Finland 17,300  12    40,650  8 16,988  13 6.02 12 11.54  15 0.9017  10 77.0  11 257  4  11 
France  17,633 11   36,550 14 17,719 11 5.17 8 10.66  14 0.9049  8 78.4  5 220 14  11 
Germany  17,130 13   36,620 13 17,105 12 2.81 2 8.30  11 0.7714  15 77.1  10 240 11  11 
Ireland 15,764  15    45,580  4 14,009  15 7.49 14 9.25  12 0.8817  14 76.5  12 253  6  12 
Italy  17,122 14   32,020 15 16,975 14 8.83 15 10.50  13 0.8920  13 78.7  4 230  13  13 
Japan 18,075  8    38,410  12 18,189  8 2.64 1 3.83  2 0.9121  6 80.5  1 207 15  7 
Netherlands 18,824  6    42,670  7 19,107  5 3.63 5 5.04  5 0.9150  4 77.8  7 250  7  6 
Norway  22,180 3    66,530 1 21,884 3 5.55 10 4.44  4 0.9194  1 78.2  6 247  8  5 
Sweden 17,994  9    43,580  6 17,815  10 5.84 11 7.18  9 0.9134  5 79.1  3 257  4  7 
Switzerland 22,547  2    57,230 2 23,731 1 2.90 3 3.32 1 0.9174 2 79.2 2 273 1 2 
United Kingdom  17,846  10    40,180  9 17,882  9 7.00 13 7.03  8 0.8970  12 77.3  9 237  12  10 
United States  23,081  1    44,970 5 23,073 2 4.10  7 5.56 6 0.9153 3 76.4 13 247  8  6 
Sources: World Bank (2007) for columns (1) to (5), and (7). 
  UNDP (2007) for column (6); 




partnerships’ (e.g., regarding energy production or banking regulation) were important 
factors.2 In contrast to these studies, we emphasize much more the aspect of 
competition embedded in the Swiss economic and political system with its ‘balancing 
capability’.3 
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides a brief history of the economic 
development of Switzerland. Section 3 presents the key success factors that, in our view, 
were crucial for the growth and development of the Swiss economy to its current level. 
This assessment is based on principles from growth theory and political economics and is 
influenced by our own interpretation of the Swiss historical development. Section 4 
concludes and attempts to derive some general lessons for other countries.  
2  A brief history of the economic development of Switzerland  
We start by documenting various indicators that warrant calling the Swiss economy a 
success story. This assessment should be based on a longer period of recent years, given 
the long-term perspective of our investigation. We then focus on the timing of the 
economic take-off.  
2.1  A success story? 
Table 1 reports a number of indicators for Switzerland and other comparable 
economies. The first column shows gross domestic product (GDP) per capita in US 
dollars, adjusted to purchasing power parity (PPP), averaged over the last 30 years 
(1975 to 2005). This indicator describes the output or income generated by the 
production factors used within the country’s boundary and thus tells us something about 
the performance of the economy, normalized per inhabitant. With US$22,547, 
Switzerland ranks second behind the United States (US$23,081) and before Norway 
(US$22,180). The second and third columns report gross national income (GNI), or 
gross national product (GNP), per capita which describes income generated by all 
production factors owned by the country’s residents used at home or abroad; it 
represents a better measure for the standard of living than GDP. Switzerland 
(US$23,731) ranks first before the United States (US$23,073) and Norway (US$21,884) 
if the PPP-adjusted figures, averaged over 1975 to 2005, are taken. Note that 
Switzerland ranked second for nominal GNP per capita in 2006 at current US dollars, 
behind Norway and before Denmark. 
                                                 
2   See David and Mach (2006: 8) who refer to Knöpfel (1988) and Brunetti (1992) regarding their 
assessment of the Swiss political system. 
3  Note that this paper does not address the issue of whether Switzerland may have lost some dynamism 
during the last decades in the twentieth century and, if this were true, what should be done about it, 
although this issue is the focus of a heated domestic debate among politicians, representatives of the 
government, interest groups, think tanks, and academics. Our paper takes a much broader view of the 
country’s development and thus can hardly provide an answer to this debate, except that we may point 
to some fundamental elements of the long-term Swiss success, which should not be forgotten in this 
debate. See, for example, Steinmann, Rentsch and Suisse (2005) for an overview of the arguments 
expressed by economists at a conference in 2005.  
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In addition to GDP and GNI, there exist many other measures that tell us something 
about the well-being of people living in a country. First, a low inflation rate frees 
people’s mind from thinking about how to evade the inflation tax. Switzerland ranks 
third with an average inflation rate of 2.90 from 1972 to 2005, behind Japan (2.64) and 
Germany (2.81). Second, a low unemployment rate increases the comfort of people as 
they worry less about losing their current job and/or finding a new one. Switzerland 
ranks first with an average unemployment rate of 3.32 per cent from 1991 to 2004, 
before Japan (3.83) and Austria (3.94). Third, the human development index (HDI) 
represents a broad measure of human development in a country, and is composed of 
GDP, life expectancy, adult literacy and enrolment for education. Switzerland ranks 
second with an index of 0.9174 averaged over 1975 to 2005, behind Norway (0.9194) 
but ahead of the United States (0.9153). Looking only at the 2005 index, Switzerland 
ranks fourth behind Norway, Ireland and Sweden. Fourth, a long life may be considered 
as an important goal—the longer we live, the more we can take advantage of all the 
options of life. With respect to life expectancy at birth, Switzerland is ranked second 
with 79.2 years (averaged from 1990 to 2005), behind Japan (80.5) and before Sweden 
(79.1). The ranks of these three countries do not change if only the most recent year is 
taken (2005). Finally, Switzerland ranks first—ex aequo with Denmark—in the life 
satisfaction index (value of 273), followed by Austria (260).4 
These top ranking positions of Switzerland indicate that the country has indeed achieved 
a successful stage of development until the beginning of the twenty-first century. Also 
note that Switzerland outperforms any of the mentioned countries in Table 1 if an 
average of a country’s rank in all eight reported indicators is calculated. Regarding this 
calculated value, Switzerland ranks first with a value of two, followed by Norway with 
a value of five and, ex aequo, by the Netherlands, the United States, Denmark and 
Austria with a value of six. Thus, there is no doubt that Switzerland is indeed a success 
story. 
2.2  When did it start?  
It is interesting to note that the geographic conditions in the alpine region required the 
small entities to organize themselves economically and politically. Whereas these 
communities mainly concentrated on cattle and dairy products in the twelfth and 
thirteenth century, early manufacturing emerged in cloth, wool and linen in the fifteenth 
century associated with an increasing degree of urbanization and an expanding artisan 
production and commerce.5 After having acquired some new territory at the battles of 
Grandson, Morat and Nancy in the fifteenth century and having made the wealthy area 
of Milan a Swiss protectorate in 1512, the Swiss were defeated by the French in the 
famous battle of Marignano (1515). A ‘perpetual peace agreement’ was signed between 
France and the (old) Swiss Confederation in 1516 which reduced Swiss appetite for 
expansion. 
                                                 
4   Note that there exist many other indices of life quality or happiness that can be readily accessed on the 
internet. In the most recent Economist Intelligence Unit’s quality-of-life index (2005), Switzerland 
ranked second behind Ireland, followed by Norway. In the 2007 worldwide quality of living survey by 
Mercer Human Resource Consulting, the two large cities of Switzerland, Zürich and Geneva, ranked 
first and second, followed by Vancouver and Vienna. Thus, these positions confirm what is reported 
by the above-mentioned life satisfaction index in Table 1. 
5  See Steinberg (1996: 18) for this and the following.  
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The European economy began to expand and industrialize in the mid-eighteenth 
century. Equipped with enough capital and supported by its tradition of mercantile 
enterprises in combination with an expanding textile and embroidery industry, 
Switzerland participated in this first round of economic take-off. An example is given 
by Steinberg (1996: 165):  
The tiny city republic of St Gallen (total population under 8,000) had sixty 
substantial mercantile houses during the eighteenth century engaged in the 
manufacture and sale of cotton, muslin and embroidery. About 100,000 spinners, 
weavers, calico printers and embroiderers worked for the city companies, mostly 
in the famous Webkeller (the weaving cellar) in each of the peasant houses dotted 
up and down the Rhine, the Thur and the Linth. East Switzerland became one of 
the richest and most thickly settled parts of Europe. 
In 1820, Switzerland accounted for around two million citizens. Its GDP per capita at 
that time is estimated at US$1,090 (see Table 2).6 While there existed some countries in 
western Europe with a lower GDP per capita (e.g., Norway or Finland), much higher 
values were exhibited by many countries such as the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, 
Belgium, Denmark or Austria. The Netherlands, for instance, accounted for a nearly 
70 per cent higher GDP per capita than Switzerland. Table 2 shows the position of 
Switzerland in comparison to all the countries reviewed in Table 1. Based on these 
figures, we can say that Swiss per capita income was relatively low in the beginning of 
the nineteenth century in comparison with the other countries, ranking 10th in the list. 
Taking the estimated figures from Maddison (2003) the relative position of Switzerland 
improved continually throughout the nineteenth century, ranking 8th in 1850, 5th in 
1870 and 3rd in 1900 and 1913. Note that at the eve of World War I, Switzerland’s 
GDP per capita is estimated at US$3,096, an amount that was surpassed only, albeit 
considerably, by the United States and the United Kingdom. These numbers should, 
however, be interpreted with great caution as they are estimates of a ‘pre-statistical 
period’. In addition, Maddison (1995:135) points to the fact that, for Switzerland, ‘the 
historical estimates are poor and weaker than for all other west European countries’. 
This gives rise to an alternative and more direct analysis of the standard of living of 
citizens, i.e., estimations of real wages. In a new study, Studer (2007) calculates real 
wages for Zurich based on the Allen-approach for the period from 1800 to 1913 and 
compares his results with Allen’s (2001) estimations of real wages of other European 
cities. His main findings are reported in Table 3 which is an extract from Studer (2007: 
Table 2) and can be summarized as follows. First, the real wage of Swiss workers, both 
building craftsmen and building labourers, were by far the lowest in 1800 when 
compared to Germany (Leipzig), Netherlands (Amsterdam), France (Strasbourg), UK 
(London), Belgium (Antwerp) and Spain (Madrid). Second, although they did catch up 
to some extent by 1910, Swiss workers before the First World War earned the third 
(labourers) or second (craftsmen) lowest real wages. The real wages in London were 54 
per cent and 70 per cent higher, respectively. But even in Leipzig, real wages were 15 
per cent higher. Note that for 2006, it is estimated that real wages were highest 
                                                 
6   These are in fact Geary-Khamis dollars. There are different methods to aggregate. One method is the 
Geary-Khamis method described in the Handbook of the International Comparison Programme (see 
United Nations Statistics Division, at: www unstats.un.org/unsd/methods/icp/ipc7_htm.htm).  
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in Zürich on a global level, whereas real wages in London are estimated to be 36 per 
cent lower (see, e.g., UBS 2006: 10).7 
Table 2 
GDP per capita, 1820-1913 
  1820 Rank  1850 Rank 1870 Rank 1990 Rank  1913 Rank 
Austria    1,218 6   1,650 6    1,863 8    2,882  8    3,465  9 
Belgium    1,319 3   1,847 3    2,692 3    3,731  4    4,220  4 
Denmark    1,274 4   1,767 5    2,003 6    3,017  6    3,912  6 
Finland   781 14   911 13   1,140  14    1,668 13   2,111 14 
France    1,135 8   1,597 7    1,876 9    2,876  9    3,485  8 
Germany   1,077  11    1,428  9   1,839  7    2,985  7    3,648  7 
Ireland    877  12         1,775  10         2,736  11 
Italy   1,117  9    1,350  10    1,499 12    1,785  12    2,564  12 
Japan   669 15   679 14  737  15    1,180 14   1,387 15 
Netherlands    1,838 1   2,371 1   2,757  2    3,424  5    4,049  5 
Norway   801 13   956 12   1,360  13    1,877 11   2,447 13 
Sweden   1,198  7    1,289  11    1,662 11    2,561  10    3,096  10 
Switzerland   1,090  10    1,488 8 2,102 5 3,833 3  4,266  3 
United Kingdom   1,706  2    2,330  2   3,190  1    4,492  1   4,921  2 
United States   1,257  5    1,806  4   2,445  4    4,091  2   5,301  1 
      
Average   1,157    1,534    1,929    2,886    3,440 
Note:  Amounts given in 1990 International Geary-Khamis dollars. 
Source:  Based on data from Maddison (2003). 
Table 3 
Real wages in European cities, 1800-1910 
Indices: Zurich = 100 
 1800 1850  1910 
  Craftsmen Labourers Craftsmen Labourers Craftsmen  Labourers 
Zurich  100 100 100 100 100  100 
Leipzig     113  94  115  114 
Amsterdam  210 242 111  97 131  129 
Strasbourg  173 215 166 117 111 96 
London  215 224 199 137 170  154 
Antwerp  224 203 167 114 147  109 
Madrid  147 111 170  98  86 66 
Source: Studer  (2007:  19). 
Based on this additional analysis Studer (2007) concludes:  
For the time being, this analysis concludes that while the Swiss economy as a 
whole improved early and was already among the most successful around 1900, 
                                                 
7  It is interesting to note that Swiss nominal wages increased considerably, more than in the other 
countries such as France, Belgium or the Netherlands, from 1885 to 1910; but real wages did not catch 
up because of steep price increases in the country. In particular, wages of (unskilled) labourers 
increased relatively more than those of (skilled) craftsmen during this period (see Studer 2007: 11 and 
18).  
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up to the First World War its workers benefited considerably less from economic 
growth than their colleagues in many other European countries. The rise of Swiss 
living standards to take a top position internationally was clearly a phenomenon of 
the short twentieth century.  
Of course, also the figures in Table 3 have to be interpreted with caution as they reflect 
individual cities and are calculated for certain professions only. Thus, there remains 
some puzzle with respect to the question when did Switzerland catch up with the 
relatively rich European countries in terms of its standard of living. 
The development of GDP per capita from 1914 to 2003 is captured by Figure 1. 
Switzerland surpassed the United Kingdom in the 1920s and the United States in the 
1950s becoming number one thereafter. However, the United States caught up in the 
second half of the 1980s and became again the richest country, as measured by 
Maddison’s (2003) GDP per capita. Note that relative to the average GDP per capita of 
the countries shown in Table 3, Switzerland increased its total real income or output in 
the period from the Second World War up to the mid-1970s, but then lost ground during 
the last 25 years of the twentieth century. 
We have emphasized that in many ways Switzerland was not predestined to become a 
success story. Without the benefit of hindsight, about 100 years ago any observer, who 
had to make a forecast of which country was bound to become richer and was given a 
choice between Uruguay or Argentina and Switzerland, would probably have gone for 
the former two as a matter of course.8 Without any natural resources and always at the 
fringes of large empires, Switzerland had little going for it. And yet, its rise from a poor 
country to one of the wealthiest nations of the world took place in a relatively short 
time. We now turn to the key success factors. 
Figure 1 
GDP per capita, 1914-2003 
 










































































































Note:  These are International Geary-Khamis dollars. 
Source:  Based on data from Maddison (2003). 
                                                 
8   Note that in 1870, Uruguay had about the same GDP pc as Switzerland. In 1900, Argentina’s GDP pc 
was higher than Uruguay’s, approximately 30 per cent lower than Switzerland’s, but quickly growing. 
See Maddison (2003).   
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3  Deep determinants of growth and four success factors  
We suggest that the Swiss experience of fast growth can mainly be explained by a 
combination of two key factors, i.e., economic competition (which promoted efficiency 
and encouraged innovation) and political contestability (which stabilized an efficient 
system of checks and balances). Both factors have been studied in the recent literature 
on economic growth and political economics, and tend to affect the long-term 
development of a country at a fundamental level. They seem more important than 
certain types of fiscal or monetary policies or the size of individual sectors which, in 
turn, are endogenous to the interaction of more fundamental determinants and 
institutions of growth.  
The quest for the deep determinants of economic growth has intensified over the last 
two decades spurred by the advances of endogenous growth theory and by the empirical 
evidence of large differences in performance across countries. The main challenge has 
been (and remains) to reduce the Solow residual, which is often called the ‘extent of our 
ignorance’ since it contributed the largest part to ‘explaining’ growth over time as well 
as growth differences across countries.9 Put differently, our understanding of the role of 
factor-accumulation (labour, capital and human capital) in the growth process is much 
more advanced than our understanding of the determinants of efficiency, productivity 
growth and innovation.  
A high degree of competition is one possible avenue for explaining productivity growth 
and innovation.  The famous Schumpeterian view of ‘creative destruction’ suggests that 
firms will innovate under the constant pressure of competition. Firms have a strong 
incentive to stay on their toes and to constantly improve the quality of their products, 
their processes and to expand their reach into new markets because this is the only way 
to improve profits. With competitive markets the entry of new competitors will quickly 
erode these profits, which again forces incumbents to either innovate or die. Of course, 
temporally limited rents of successful innovators may be necessary to cover their fixed 
innovation costs and thus be granted by patent laws in some industries; but without 
competition the innovation process quickly becomes obstructed.10 In the empirical 
literature a high degree of market competition has, therefore, been found to be an 
important determinant of growth (see e.g., Aghion and Griffith 2005). 
Another branch of the growth literature, which is relevant for our interpretation of the 
Swiss case, is the one emphasizing the role of institutional quality and stability.11 The 
argument is that institutions that provide stability and security of property rights are a 
necessary condition for growth. Conversely, an environment characterized by sudden 
changes in power, by constant fear of expropriation and uncertainty about the possibility 
to enforce contracts will stifle incentives to invest and innovate. It appears that 
throughout history, discretionary regimes have been more frequent than systems of rule 
of law. Therefore, scholars such as Douglass North have suggested that the rise of the 
western world can largely be explained by the emergence of political systems which 
                                                 
9  See e.g., Weil (2005) for an overview of the literature on fundamental growth determinants.  
10 See also Moser (2005) who studies innovations in the nineteenth century and finds that patent laws 
seem to affect the direction of technical change.  
11 See, for example, North (1990, 1991) and Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2005).  
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controlled the abuse of power and secured property and contract rights. This line of 
argument has also received attention from researchers who have investigated the causes 
of cross-country differences in growth. They suggest that these differences are in part 
due to differences in the stability of property and contract rights and more generally in 
the credibility of the political system.12   
In the following, we suggest that the main lessons from the Swiss growth experience 
can be condensed into four key success factors. Two of these relate to a competitive 
environment in goods and factor markets and the other two to a high degree of 
contestability in the institutional and political setting.   
3.1  Openness leads to early internationalization 
The small size of the domestic market forced Swiss firms to internationalize from the 
start. In 1920, many Swiss industries exported extremely large shares of their domestic 
production, such as chemicals (90 per cent), watches (98 per cent), silk (95 per cent), 
stitchery (95 per cent) or chocolate (80 per cent) (Himmel 1992: 2). Also, Swiss firms 
heavily increased their foreign direct investments at the end of the nineteenth century. In 
1890, six out of ten multinational companies (MNCs) from Belgium, Denmark, 
Netherlands, Sweden and Switzerland were located in Switzerland.13 In 1914, this 
number equalled 29 out of 57 MNCs. The high degree of openness is still clearly visible 
today, and can be demonstrated by a number of different measures. Table 4 gives an 
overview of the current internationalization of the Swiss economy in comparison with 
other countries. First, the ‘global trade intensity’ measured as exports plus imports of 
goods and services divided by GDP shows that Switzerland, ranking 7th, is found in the 
middle range of the 14 countries considered. This should not come as a surprise as 
smaller countries are expected to show higher trade intensity.14 Second, Switzerland 
ranks 3rd in the global income exchange intensity that adds income payments and 
receipts regarding internationally traded factors of production relative to GDP. Third, 
the share of foreigners measured as the stock of foreign born residents relative to total 
population equalled 22 per cent in 2005 which ranks Switzerland in first place. Fourth, 
global migration intensity is calculated as emigrants plus immigrants in percent of total 
population which, again, puts Switzerland on rank 1. 
Fifth, Switzerland is an important source country of foreign direct investment which, if 
the stock is taken in relation to GDP, ranks the country in first place; it confirms the 
considerable direct investments Swiss firms made and accumulated throughout history. 
Finally, the globalization index published by KOF in 2008 which takes into account 
many ‘economic, social and political dimensions of globalization’, places Switzerland 
in 4th position, behind Belgium, Austria and Sweden. Taking the average of all 
available ranks in Table 4, Switzerland, among the countries considered, appears as the 
nation with the highest degree of internationalization at the beginning of the twenty-first 
century. 
                                                 
12  See Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2005), Weder (1993), Borner, Brunetti and Weder (1995) and 
Brunetti (1998). 
13 See Schröter (1993: 31). See also Enright and Weder (1995) for an analysis of the internationalization 
of a number of industries throughout history. 
14 See Weder (2007) for an assessment, taking into account the country size.  
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2003   2005  Rank 
(1) (2)    (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)     (8)   
Austria  8,059  253.1  103.3  4 13.8  8 15.0 2 1.8  2 59.1  23  9 91.38  2  4.5 
Belgium  10,348  301.9  164.1  2 68.2  1 6.9 12 1.2  10 na  na  na  92.09 1  5.2 
Denmark 5,387  211.9    83.0  5 15.8  6 7.2 11 1.8  2 77.07  36  7  88.42 5  6.0 
Finland 5,210  161.9    69.0  8 13.7  9 3.0 14 0.6  12 68.7  42  5  84.65 9  9.5 
France 59,725  1,757.6    52.2 13 10.3 11 10.6  7 na  na 643.4 37 6  85.38  8  9.0 
Germany 82,551  2,403.2    67.5  10 10.7  10 12.3 6 1.8  2 622.5  26  8 83.01  10  7.7 
Ireland  3,947  153.7  168.7  1 63.4  2 14.1  3 1.7 5 33.53 22  10  79.82  11  5.3 
Italy 57,646  1,468.3    53.0  12 8.5  13 4.3 13 0.5  13 138.88  9  13  79.44  13  12.8 
Japan 127,210  4,300.9    21.1  15 2.9 15 1.6 15 0.4  14 335.5 8  14  60.91  15  14.7 
Netherlands  16,215  511.5  120.1  3 19.7  5 10.0 8 1.3  8 384.4  75  2  88.4  6  5.3 
Norway 4,560  220.9    68.5  9 9.5  12 7.4  10 1.4 6 40.64 18  12  79.75  12  10.2 
Sweden 8,956  301.6    81.5  6 15.0  7 12.4 5 1.0  11 189.28  63  4 90.02  3  6.0 
Switzerland 7,344 320.1   81.0 7 26.7 3 22.3 1 2.8  1 344.1 107 1 88.6 4 2.8 
United Kingdom 59,280  1,794.9   55.4  11 21.7  4 9.0  9 1.4  6 1128.58  63  3  86.67  7  6.7 
United States  291,044  10,948.6   23.4  14 5.0  14 12.9  4 1.3  8 2069.01 19  11  76.76  14  10.8 
Sources: Weder (2007) for columns (1) to (4); 
  World Bank (2007) for columns (5) and (6); 





Another sign of openness is that Switzerland resisted protecting declining industries. 
Examples are the textile industry, the embroidery industry or, more recently, the textile 
machinery industry—industries that were very important in the economy at the time. 
The textile industry underwent a brutal structural change over the first half of the 
twentieth century and has virtually disappeared.15 However, there are exceptions to this 
generally high degree of integration into the world economy. In agriculture, Switzerland 
has become one of the most protectionist countries of the world. In some areas of public 
services (e.g., transportation, electricity) the Swiss decided not to deregulate as much as 
other countries, which made these areas difficult for foreign competitors to access. 
However, it is widely recognized that consumers are paying a high price for these 
policies and that these areas may, to some extent, become a drag on the economy’s 
development. In these protected areas the stabilizing political system (see section 3.3) 
provides substantial power to veto players and thus may prevent reforms and 
adjustments.16  
3.2  Openness and competition lead to flexible factor markets  
The small size of the country and its location in the centre of Europe not only promoted 
an early internationalization of Swiss firms but also led to a natural high degree of 
immigration and emigration. Switzerland benefited from immigrants and the knowledge 
they brought during the early phases of the industrialization: the Huguenots in Geneva 
created the watch industry and chemists from abroad moved to Basel and promoted the 
dyestuff industry. Some of the largest multinationals were founded by immigrants (e.g., 
Henri Nestlé, Charles Brown and Walter Boveri). Other examples are Cailler and 
Suchard who benefited from foreign knowledge in the nineteenth century. Foreigners 
accounted for 5 per cent of the population in 1860, increased to 15 per cent already in 
1910 before declining to 6 per cent in 1950 (Ritzmann-Blickenstorfer 1998). After the 
Second World War, the share of foreigners in Switzerland rose steadily to exceed 20 per 
cent in 2000. The share of foreigners living in Switzerland is currently high by 
comparison with other countries, even when compared with small countries, as shown 
by Table 4. Most interestingly, the intensity of inward and outward migration is 
extremely high in Switzerland and so is the extent of border commuting which is 
reflected in Switzerland’s high net income payments to neighbouring countries for 
labour. 
This contrasts with the view that Switzerland has very restrictive immigration policies, a 
view mainly due to the experience of the 1970s, when a large number of the so-called 
‘guest workers’ returned to their countries of origin. Danthine and Lambelet (1987: 163) 
argue that this sequence in the country’s history is largely misunderstood, as 
Switzerland, in fact, did not ‘export its unemployment’ by firing and deporting foreign 
workers: ‘Indeed, because of a high turnover rate of guest workers, the largest part of 
the decrease in foreign population was achieved by not replacing those who had left 
voluntarily’. However, the form of immigration control, which favoured short-term 
employment, probably was damaging, as it distorted incentives and led to an influx of 
                                                 
15  Another example is given by Danthine and Lambelet (1987: 169) who report that from 1965 to 1975, 
employment in the banking sector increased by 40 per cent while it declined in the watch industry by 
almost 45 per cent. 
16  This argument has been emphasized by, for example, Borner, Brunetti and Straubhaar (1990).  
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low-skilled, while preventing the immigration of high-skilled people. The bilateral 
negotiations with the EU have brought certain liberalization and the higher inflow of 
highly qualified and skilled immigrants from the EU contributed to the good economic 
performance of the first years of the twenty-first century, as many believe. 
A second advantage of Switzerland is that it enjoys greater labour market flexibility 
than many other European countries. By comparison with its neighbouring countries, 
wage bargaining is decentralized, minimum wages are few and rarely binding, labour 
conflicts are solved at the company level and generally do not develop in big country-
wide strikes or the like. Labour protection laws are flexible, giving employers the 
possibility to terminate at short notice; firing costs are low and consequently the labour 
market reaction to a downturn is fast and so is the willingness of companies to hire new 
people once conditions improve (see e.g., Straubhaar and Werner 2003: 72). This view 
is confirmed by Figure 2 in which we interpret the so-called employment law index as a 
measure of labour market inflexibility. As explained by Botero et al. (2004: 1353), their 
employment law index is calculated based on four indices measuring the costs of 
(i) alternative employment contracts, (ii) increasing hours worked, (iii) firing workers 
and (iv) dismissal procedures.17 Figure 2 shows that the labour market inflexibility 
index is relatively low in Switzerland in comparison to the countries we have been 
looking at in this paper. In fact, the index is only lower in the United States and the 
United Kingdom. 
One interesting question, which is beyond the scope of this paper, is why Switzerland 
was able to keep flexible labour markets. Presumably, most countries at some stage had  
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Source:  Botero et al. (2004: 1362-3). 
                                                 
17   Botero et al. (2004: 1353) confirm, in our view, our interpretation of their index: ‘Our index of 
employment laws, more so than other indices, reflects the incremental cost to the employer of 
deviating from a hypothetical rigid contract, in which the conditions of a job are specified and a 
worker cannot be fired. This index is thus an economic measure of protection of (employed) workers, 
and not just a reflection of legal formalism’.  
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little labour regulation and over the course of the twentieth century gradually provided 
more and more protection to the insiders of the labour market and/or employed labour. 
How did Switzerland avoid this protectionist process? Part of the answer could be that 
the country avoided some of the worst regulations by historical accident. For instance, 
Switzerland’s public servants never enjoyed extensive benefits as, for example, the ones 
granted to German public servants. Therefore, when the Swiss moved to abolish the 
status of a public servant in the second half of the 1990s, this reform was accepted and 
implemented with little noise.18 In Germany, for example, such a reform would seem 
politically impossible to implement. This brings us to the second part of the story on 
how the Swiss political system interacts with the economic system and serves as a 
stabilizing force.  
3.3  A contestable political system leads to political stability 
One way of describing the Swiss political system is to note that it is highly contestable 
simply because there is a large number of veto players that can easily enter the political 
system. On the one hand, the cantons have a very strong political position: not only do 
they have the voting powers in the second chamber of parliament, but they also have 
right to make initiatives and referenda, and a popular vote necessitates both the majority 
of the population as well as the majority of the cantons. Political power is equally 
distributed among the cantons, which means that some small (mountainous) cantons can 
be decisive players in any vote.  
The most important and distinguishing feature of the Swiss political system, however, is 
direct democracy. Any group of citizens, which has the organizational power to 
collect 50,000 signatures is able to call a referendum (a popular vote) on any law that is 
passed by the parliament. Once a referendum is introduced, the law in question has to be 
put to a popular vote which can be costly, time consuming and involve high 
uncertainties about the outcome. Therefore, the political parties in parliament try to 
anticipate the concerns of interest groups and to negotiate a compromise ex ante. The 
instrument of the referendum is important in understanding why the Swiss form of 
democracy evolved into a mechanism that is highly trained to find compromises and on 
incorporate the concerns of all potential veto players. The result is a very stable system. 
We call this important element ‘contestability’ because of its analogy to contestable 
markets that are highly vulnerable to potential entry of firms. This threat constrains the 
behaviour of the incumbents (Baumol 1982: 4). 
Relating this back to the language used in the growth literature: the Swiss political 
system restricts the abuse of power and guarantees a high degree of stability and 
predictability of property and contract rights. Standard indicators of the quality of 
institutions document the good performance of the Swiss political and legal system 
particularly in terms of ‘political stability’ and ‘rule of law’. The Swiss position in these 
and other governance indicators is shown in Table 5. Note that the numbers reflect the 
                                                 
18  Merzyn and Ursprung (2005: 38) mention, as a side point, that measures of granting public schools 
more autonomy such as ‘delegating hiring and dismissal of teachers to the school management, 
thereby abolishing the civil servant status of public school teachers (…) were politically rather 
uncontroversial’. The parliament in the canton of Zurich decided to voluntarily put the new law with 
many more and politically more important elements to a popular referendum which was accepted by 
60 per cent of the voters.   
14 
rank of a country among all the countries considered where ‘100’ corresponds to highest 
and ‘0’ to lowest rank. It is worth mentioning that also other industrialized countries are 
able to achieve good performance on most of these indicators with political systems that 
lack the unique features of Switzerland’s direct democracy. However, these indicators 
were mainly constructed to measure differences across the world. Therefore, the 
differences among industrialized countries may be somewhat underestimated.  
One indication that the stability of the Swiss institutions is of a different quality from 
that of other rich countries is apparent in the so-called ‘interest rate island’, the fact that 
yields of Swiss-Franc assets (in particular, money market assets and bonds) have been 
systematically lower than the gains of other major currencies (even after controlling for 
Swiss Franc appreciation). In other words, investors have been willing to forego some 
return, i.e., pay a higher price, to hold Swiss-Franc assets. It has been argued by Kugler 
and Weder (2004, 2005), that this interest rate bonus could be explained if investors 
believe that the Swiss Franc (and presumably the Swiss institutions more in general) 
could behave differently than the rest of the world in times of crises. 
Table 5 
Indicators of governance 
  Percentile rank (0-100) 
 Rule 











Italy 60.0  82.2  91.1  94.6  96.2  94.7 
France 89.5  69.2  92.4 87.8  94.7  91.3 
Japan 90.0  74.0  100.0 99.0  100.0  99.0 
Belgium 91.0  99.0  97.6 97.1  98.1  100.0 
United States  91.9  61.5 85.8  82.9 92.3  91.7 
United Kingdom  93.3  75.0 90.5  91.2 95.7  93.2 
Netherlands 93.8  56.3 67.3  74.1 86.5  64.1 
Germany 94.3  85.1  88.2  87.3  75.5  90.3 
Sweden 96.7  70.7  95.3  95.6  99.0  96.1 
Austria 97.1  91.8  98.1 90.7  98.6  96.6 
Finland 98.1  88.0  96.7 92.7  96.6  97.6 
Switzerland 98.6  98.6 98.6  93.2 99.5  97.1 
Norway 99.0  61.1  94.8 98.0  92.8  93.7 
Denmark 99.5  57.7  92.9 93.7  83.7  89.3 
Notes:  Rule of law: the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and 
in particular the quality of contract enforcement, the police, and the courts, as well as the 
likelihood of crime and violence. 
  Political stability and absence of violence: perception of the likelihood that the government will be 
destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, including domestic violence and 
terrorism. 
  Government effectiveness: the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the 
degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and 
implementation, and the credibility of the government’s commitment to such policies. 
  Regulatory quality: the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and 
regulations that permit and promote private sector development. 
  Voice and accountability: the extent to which a country’s citizens are able to participate in 
selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a free 
media. 
  Control of corruption: the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including 
both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as ‘capture’ of the state by the elites and private 
interests. 
Source:  World Bank (n.d.) 
  World Bank (2007: 2) for indicator definitions  
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3.4  Competition among cantons for footloose factors increases state efficiency 
Switzerland was constituted in a process in which an increasing number of small 
cantons joined the confederation. The process took several centuries and created a 
country in which decisionmaking remained highly decentralized. The strong position of 
the cantons in the old confederation led to a federal structure in the 1848 constitution 
with a relatively weak central government. The high degree of federalism can be 
demonstrated most easily in the area of fiscal policies and competencies. 
Appendix 1 compares the allocation of competencies of various government tasks at 
different levels of jurisdictions in Switzerland and in Austria, another alpine country. A 
review of the table indicates that, in general, the degree of subsidiarity in a number of 
areas is larger in Switzerland, i.e., competence is higher at the communal and cantonal 
level than in Austria. Also, in Switzerland, the competence to levy taxes and to decide 
expenditures is allocated mostly to the local level. By comparison, the Austrian tax 
system is much more centralized and taxes are shared between all three levels and 
expenditures are more often made at the federal level than in Switzerland. 
Another notable characteristic of the Swiss fiscal system is the high degree of tax 
competition. Table 6 reports the development of the indices of the total tax burden for 
the Swiss cantons from 1990 to 2006. The numbers are interesting for two reasons. 
First, there is considerable difference between the levels of the cantonal tax rates. Note, 
for example, that taxes were 37 per cent higher in Uri than on average in 2006, whereas 
they were almost 50 per cent below average in the canton of Zug. Thus, these numbers 
exemplify the high degree of tax competition among cantons. Second, taxes do change 
over time. Take, for example, the case of Basel-Stadt and Basel-Land, two neighbouring 
cantons. Their taxes were only about 2 per cent apart in 1990. However, taxes in Basel-
Land fell whereas those in Basel-Stadt tended to increase in the following years with 
some convergence thereafter. Table 6 thus also seems to show that cantons do in fact 
compete by changing their behaviour and also by reacting to each other. 
While it is often argued that tax competition leads to a race to the bottom and that public 
goods will no longer be provided at the desired level, the Swiss experience suggests that 
tax competition does not necessarily result in a low provision of public goods. Rather, it 
seems that tax competition has increased the incentives for local governments to 
improve efficiency and to listen carefully to their constituency.19 The Swiss experience 
suggests that one benefit of federalism is tax competition and fiscal discipline and a 
pressure to keep the state efficient and small. In Switzerland, public expenditure of the 
general government was about 35 per cent of GDP in 2007, which is among the lowest 
shares among the OECD governments, as shown by Figure 3. If the share of public 
expenditures in GDP is considered as a proxy for the level of state involvement, then 
Switzerland clearly has a more light-handed government than its immediate neighbours 
and other continental European countries. Note that government involvement has been 
reduced in some countries (e.g., Sweden, Denmark, Finland and Norway in the last 
years), whereas it has further increased in Switzerland and other countries with a 
traditionally low government share. Thus, there seems to be some convergence of the 
levels observed. 
                                                 
19 See, e.g., Feld and Kirchgässner (2001, 2003). See also Afonso, Schuknecht and Tanzi (2005) and 
Eichenberger (1999).  
 
Table 6 
Index of total tax burden in Swiss cantons over time 
Year  1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004  2005  2006 
Total  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0  100.0 100.0 
      
Zurich  84.8 82.9 83.4 83.2 83.1 82.9 82.2 80.3 80.0 83.6 83.3 87.1 90.2 90.0 91.3  92.2 85.8 
Berne  113.8 117.8 117.6 122.6 120.9 117.8 117.9 120.4 120.3 123.9 124.2 115.1 112.4 114.4 113.7  115.7 121.0 
Lucerne  122.9 106.1 102.6 106.7 108.1 115.6 115.1 116.6 116.8 116.5 117.0 120.5 124.9 124.3 126.0  114.5 115.2 
Uri 125.5  134.4  131.3  102.3  98.1  92.0 91.7 88.7 88.5 93.0 95.0  114.3 133.8 137.9 145.9 149.3  137.8 
Schwyz  78.4 86.9 87.0 88.3 84.8 87.7 86.1 82.7 81.3 78.5 75.3 65.1 63.0 64.5 64.1  68.3 68.5 
      
Obwalden 114.0  126.9  121.1  120.8  116.5 118.2 117.0 116.0 116.9 108.1 108.2 123.2 145.2 143.1 150.3  155.8 136.0 
Nidwalden 82.2  84.6  81.9  80.7  79.1 74.2 73.1 72.2 70.3 71.2 71.1 75.0 76.1 77.0 75.2  75.7 78.0 
Glarus  122.1 111.9 109.8 112.2 110.8 115.5 115.2 111.9 108.1  97.7 99.1  105.8  111.9  116.6 123.6  125.0 127.5 
Zug  56.9 60.4 57.6 58.5 57.8 57.3 56.9 57.3 57.3 58.7 58.2 50.7 50.8 52.3 51.7  52.7 52.4 
Freiburg  117.0 124.7 119.4 126.4 124.2 130.6 130.5 124.8 124.8 115.7 116.4 127.0 133.2 135.7 130.3  131.3 124.3 
      
Solothurn 107.8  106.3  115.4  102.9  107.8 96.8 98.7 99.4  100.3 98.7  100.1  112.2  113.1  115.9 111.6  110.3 112.8 
Basel-Stadt 102.6  105.1  110.6  109.7  113.0 110.3 110.5 111.9 112.1 110.4 111.3 118.6 119.5 116.8 113.5  112.1 115.4 
Basel-Landschaft 100.0 82.6 82.3 90.0 90.6 92.3 91.6 93.2 93.0 90.3 91.1 93.6 95.8 98.2 94.1  93.9 96.2 
Schaffhausen 101.2  105.5  102.8  107.2  105.0 104.4 103.7  99.5  99.0 100.0 101.4 109.5 113.2 114.4 114.9  116.8 112.2 
Appenzell A. Rh.  95.7  106.1  106.2  104.4 101.2 107.8 108.4 106.2 106.1 105.2 105.8 105.6 108.6 110.3 114.4  118.7 117.9 
      
Appenzell I. Rh.  116.1  107.7  109.1  116.1  109.9  100.6 97.7 97.5 94.3 88.8 89.1 85.4 94.7 96.5 97.2  97.7  100.3 
St. Gallen  90.0  85.2  87.1  95.6  94.7 98.2 97.7 99.2  100.0 101.5 102.3 100.5 101.2 104.7 108.1  110.8 113.4 
Grisons 104.4  106.4  101.7  98.8  98.6 102.2 102.1  90.5  90.6  91.6 92.1  103.2  111.1  114.9 116.5  120.3 118.8 
Aargau  100.7  100.1 96.6 98.4 96.2 98.6 98.5 97.3 96.6 96.2 96.5 88.4 82.6 84.6 84.5  86.8 90.2 
Thurgau  86.3 99.3 95.3 88.8 92.3 97.1 97.8  101.0  101.5  105.1 106.0 108.6 101.8 101.4 102.5  82.7  84.0 
      
Ticino  102.5 104.8 101.8 105.4 105.6  96.2 96.3 96.9 97.6 95.0 90.4 84.4 83.2 71.7 70.8  73.1 74.3 
Waadt  109.0 107.6 104.1 107.9 109.5 108.1 108.1 109.4 109.3 108.9 109.8 111.9 110.2 102.7 102.2  102.6 107.2 
Valais  143.0 147.6 140.8 119.6 116.7 124.9 124.6 130.1 130.0 122.1 123.0 121.2 128.2 135.6 131.5  134.1 115.9 
Neuenburg 123.4  129.6  135.8  126.4  130.1 125.5 125.7 124.4 126.4 125.3 126.7 122.6 126.1 128.2 128.8  132.5 133.7 
Geneva 108.0  111.3  115.9  112.4 114.1 110.9 112.7 113.3 113.5 107.0 103.8  96.2  92.0 93.1 95.7  95.2 97.5 
Jura  135.1 137.4 142.8 134.7 132.1 127.0 130.8 130.5 131.8 124.9 126.3 132.0 131.0 135.9 138.1  121.8 125.1 
Note:  This index takes into account taxes in income and wealth of individuals, taxes on profit and capital of firms, as well as on vehicles. 
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Note:  Data refer to the general government sector, which is a consolidation of accounts for the central, 
state and local governments plus social security. Total outlays are defined as current outlays 
plus capital outlays. 
Source:  OECD Economic Outlook 81 database. 
The Swiss experience shows that competition between different states for mobile factors 
of production provides incentives for the efficient provision of public services, rather 
than leading to a race to the bottom. And the institutional competition also fostered 
institutional innovation. Rather than uniform solutions, flexible, local and diverse 
solutions have emerged and these have served the Swiss economy well.  
4  Conclusions and lessons for other countries  
In this paper we have suggested that the Swiss growth experience can be understood, on 
the one hand, in terms of a high degree of competition and the resulting flexibility and 
innovation in the economic sphere, and on the other hand, in terms of a high degree of 
contestability in the political sphere resulting in an efficient and stable political 
environment. Certainly there were important historical and geographical incidents that 
promoted both factors. However, it would be too simplistic to explain everything with 
geography, topology and chance. There are other small countries in Europe or Central 
Asia that did not develop well or at least not as well as Switzerland.   
Some puzzle remains as to whether the Swiss catching-up with respect to economic 
output and standard of living in Europe happened mainly in the second half of the 
nineteenth century up to the First World War or thereafter. Our analysis suggests that 
the roots of the successful development go back to the nineteenth century with the 
creation of the Swiss confederation in 1848, the Confederatio Helevetica, and the 
attraction of a number of entrepreneurs and specialists who promoted the domestic and 
international expansion of many firms in various industries. This early 
internationalization of Swiss industries increased the country’s GDP in the nineteenth 
century absolutely and relatively to other European countries and raised the standard of 
living mainly thereafter in the twentieth century. It seems that economic competition 
through a high degree of internationalization, openness and flexibility really paid off in  
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the twentieth century in conjunction with the contestable political system that helped to 
balance interests and to maintain economic flexibility. 
In our view, some elements of the experience of Switzerland can and should be copied 
by other countries: open and flexible markets are among these. This includes access of 
foreign goods and services to domestic markets, but also the free mobility of people in 
form of migration and border commuting as well as a high degree of labour market 
flexibility. Other elements may also appear attractive: the elements of direct democracy 
(especially the facultative referendum) and of federalism (e.g., tax competition). 
However, these seem to be difficult to introduce since they involve a considerable 
redistribution of political power. 
How difficult this can be is exemplified, for instance, by the repeated attempts to 
decentralize and to reform the federalist system in Germany. Although there is a 
theoretical consensus to devolve power to the states (‘Länder’), there is hardly ever an 
agreement on the practical mechanism since it would mean redistributing power among 
existing players. In general, the only way to circumvent the problem of existing 
stakeholders having to agree to a redistribution of power is to conceive institutional 
reforms behind a ‘veil of ignorance’ (e.g., by moving the starting point into the future) 
or to use a supranational mechanism (e.g., the EU which has served as a force of change 
by establishing a clear system of steps and policies to be adopted before access of new 
members).  
A final point to note is that a system with many veto players is good for growth only 
when it serves to stabilize an open and competitive economic system, as happens to be 
the case mostly in Switzerland. By contrast, many developing countries still require 
reforms that open up markets and lead to a weakening of interest groups that currently 
benefit from protection. It may well be that having a Swiss-type of political system type 
would lead to sclerosis if economic openness is lacking since short-term losers have 
considerable power to resist reforms. For example, in a country like Germany, which 
needs further flexibility in labour and capital markets, introducing more veto players 
could make economic reforms harder, not easier. One might, on the other hand, also 
argue that well-informed citizens—through referenda—can change the game among 
organized interest groups and help to reform an economy in a direction that politicians 
alone could not do. Direct democracy thus seems to have been an important element of 
the success story in the case of Switzerland—but cannot serve as a magic bullet to bring 
forward any country. It is the combination of economic competition and political 
contestability that counts.   
19 
References 
Acemoglu, D., S. Johnson, and J. Robinson (2005). ‘Institutions as the Fundamental 
Cause of Long-Run Growth’. In P. Aghion and S. Durlauf (eds), Handbook of 
Economic Growth. Amsterdam: North Holland. 
Afonso, A., L. Schuknecht, and V. Tanzi (2005). ‘Public Sector Efficiency: An 
International Comparison’. Public Choice, 123 (3-4): 321-47. 
Aghion, P., and R. Griffith (2005). Competition and Growth: Reconciling Theory and 
Evidence. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.  
Allen, R. C. (2001). ‘The Great Divergence in European Wages and Prices from the 
Middle Ages to the First World War’. Explorations in Economic History, 38 (4): 
411-47. 
Baumol, W. J. (1982). ‘Contestable Markets: An Uprising in the Theory of Industry 
Structure’. American Economic Review, 72 (1): 1-15. 
Borner, S., A. Brunetti, and T. Straubhaar (1990). Schweiz AG, Vom Sonderfall zum 
Sanierungsfall?. Zürich: NZZ-Velag. 
Borner, S., A. Brunetti, and B. Weder (1995). Political Credibility and Economic 
Development. New York: Macmillan. 
Botero, J. C., S. Djankov, R. La Porta, F. Lopez de Silanes, and A. Shleifer (2004). ‘The 
Regulation of Labour’. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 119 (4): 1339-82.  
Brunetti, A. (1992). Politisches System und Wirtschaftswachstum. Chur: Rüegger. 
Brunetti, A. (1998). ‘Policy Volatility and Economic Growth: A Comparative, 
Empirical Analysis’. European Journal of Political Economy, 14 (1): 35-52. 
Danthine, J.-P., and J.-C. Lambelet (1987). ‘The Swiss Recipe: Conservative Policies 
Ain’t Enough!’. Economic Policy, 2 (5): 147-79. 
David, T., and A. Mach (2006). ‘Institutions and Economic Growth: the Successful 
Experience of Switzerland, 1870-1950’. WIDER Research Paper 2006/101. Helsinki: 
UNU-WIDER. 
(The) Economist (n.d.). The Economist Intelligent Unit’s Quality of Life Index. 
Eichenberger, R. (1999). ‘Mit Direkter Demokratie zu Besserer Wirtschafts- und 
Finanzpolitik: Theorie und Empirie’. In H. von Armin (ed.), Adäquate Institutionen: 
Voraussetzung für ‘Gute’ Bürgernahe Politik?. Berlin: Schriftenreihe der 
Hochschule Speyer, Band, 133. 
Enright, M. J., and R. Weder (eds) (1995). Studies in Swiss Competitive Advantage. 
Bern: Peter Lang. 
Feld, L. P., and F. Schneider (2002). ‘Zum Wandel des Föderalismus: Einige 
Vergleichende Anmerkungen zu Österreich und der Schweiz’. In U. Wagschal and 
H. Rentsch (eds), Der Preis des Föderalismus. Zurich: Orell Füssli, 267-91. 
Feld, L. P., and G. Kirchgässner (2001). ‘Income Tax Competition at the State and 
Local Level in Switzerland’. Regional Science and Urban Economics, 31 (2-3): 181-
213.  
20 
Feld, L. P., and G. Kirchgässner (2003). ‘The Impact of Corporate and Personal Income 
Taxes on the Locations of Firms and on Employment: some Panel Evidence from the 
Swiss Cantons’. Journal of Public Economics, 87 (1): 129-55. 
Himmel, E. (1922). ‘Industrielle Kapitalanlagen der Schweiz im Auslande’. Zürich: 
Universität Zürich. Dissertation. 
Knöpfel, C. (1988). Des Einfluss der politischen Stabilität auf die internationale 
Wettbewerbsfähigkeit der Schweiz: Kritische analyse eines Standortfaktors. Grüsch: 
Rüegger. 
KOF (2008). Index of Globalization. On-line Edition. 
Kugler, P., and B. Weder (2004). ‘International Portfolio Holdings and Swiss Franc 
Asset Returns’. Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics, 140 (3): 301-25. 
Kugler, P., and B. Weder (2005). ‘The Failure of Long-Run Uncovered Interest Rate 
Parity for Swiss Franc Assets’. Applied Economic Quarterly, 51 (3): 231-46. 
Maddison, A. (1995). Monitoring the World Economy, 1820-1992. Paris: OECD. 
Maddison, A. (2003). The World Economy: Historical Statistics. Paris: OECD. 
Merzyn, W., and H. W. Ursprung (2005). ‘Voter Support for Privatizing Education: 
Evidence on Self-Interest and Ideology’. European Journal of Political Economy, 21 
(1): 33-58. 
Moser, P. (2005). ‘How do Patent Laws Influence Innovation? Evidence from 
Nineteenth Century World’s Fairs’. American Economic Review, 95 (4): 1214-36. 
North, D. C. (1990). Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Perspectives. New 
York: Cambridge University Press. 
North, D. C. (1991). ‘Institutions’. The Journal Economic Perspectives, 5 (1): 97-112. 
Ritzmann-Blickenstorfer, H. (1998). 150 Jahre Schweizerischer Bundesstaat im Lichte 
der Statistik. Bern: Bundesamt für Statistik. 
Schröter, H. G. (1993). Aufstieg der Kleinen, Multinationale Unternehmen aus fünf 
kleinen Staaten vor 1914. Berlin: Schriften zur Wirtschafts- und Sozialgeschichte, 
Band 42. 
Steinberg, J. (1996). Why Switzerland? Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Steinmann, L., H. Rentsch, and A. Suisse (eds) (2005). Diagnose: Wachstumsschwäche. 
DieDebatte über die fehlende Dynamik der Schweizerischen Volkswirtschaft. Zürich: 
NZZ Libro. 
Straubhaar, T., and H. Werner (2003). ‘Abreitsmarkt Schweiz: Ein Erfolgsmodell?’. 
Mitteilungen aus der Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung, 36 (1): 60-76. 
Stucki, L. (1981). Das Heimliche Imperium: Wie die Schweiz reich wurde. Huber: 
Frauenfeld. 
Studer, R. (2007). ‘When Did the Swiss Get so Rich? Comparing Living Standards in 
Switzerland and Europe, 1800-1913’. European Journal of Economic History 
(forthcoming).  
21 
UBS (2006). Preise und Löhne. Ein Kaufkraftvergleich rund um die Welt. Ausgabe. 
Weber, M. (1934). Die protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus. Tübingen: 
J. C. B. Mohr. 
Weder, B. (1993). Wirtschaft zwischen Anarchie und Rechtsstaat. Chur. Verlag 
Rüegger. 
Weder, R. (2007). ‘Swiss International Economic Relations: Assessing a Small and 
Open Economy’. In C. Church (ed.), Switzerland and the European Union: A Close, 
Contradictory and Misunderstood Relationship. London: Rutledge, 99-125. 
Weil, D. N. (2005). Economic Growth. Boston: Addison-Wesley. 
White, A. G. (2007). ‘A Global Projection of Subjective Wellbeing. A Challenge to 
Positive Psychology’. Psychtalk, 56: 17-20. 
World Bank (2007). A Decade of Measuring the Quality of Governance, Governance 
Matters, 2007. Washington, DC: World Bank. 




Competence allocation to different jurisdictional levels in Switzerland and Austria 
 Switzerland  Austria 
   Federal Cantonal Communal  Federal  ‘Laender’  Communal
Income tax  *  **  *  X  x  X 
Revenue and capital tax  *  **  *  X  x  X 
Wealth tax  -  **  *  -  -  - 
Indirect taxes  *  -  -  X  x  X 
Public security  *  **  *  **  *  * 
Justice *  **  -  **  *  - 
Police and firefighters  -  **  *  **  *  * 
Defence *  -  -  *  -  - 
Education *  **  *  **  *  * 
Primary schools  -  *  **  -  **  * 
General education school  *  **  -  *  -  - 
Universities *  **  -  *  -  - 
Culture and leisure  -  *  **  *  *  * 
Healthcare -  **  *  *  **  * 
Social welfare  *  *  *  *  -  - 
Social insurance  **  *  -  *  -  - 
Public welfare/social aid  -  *  **  **  *  * 
Traffic *  *  *  **  *  * 
Environment/regional planning  *  **  **  *  *  ** 
Note:  * = Competence at the respective level 
  ** = Higher competence with respect to other levels 
  X = tax sharing 
Source:  Feld and Schneider (2002: Table 1). 